

INTRODUCTION

The main thread running through this collection of some of my main papers published since the late 1980s is conflict resolution, in the sense that the various topics addressed, be they case studies or wider questions have, with a few exceptions, as their ultimate aim a mutually acceptable and viable settlement.

Another thread is less obvious. It is an underlining ethical dimension, in the sense that most conflicts, however zero-sum they may be to the two or more adversaries, they can be better addressed if the ethical-normative dimension is also introduced, contrary to power politics which is more often than not self-defeating. Put in a nutshell acting ethically and justly internationally and honourably towards one's adversary is a wiser strategy than the 'hard' *Realpolitik* line, the paraphernalia of aggressive postures, containment, deterrence, zero-sum thinking, selfish security concerns (and hardly 'common security'), blackmailing tactics and the like. The power politics approach creates 'security dilemmas', fans mutual animosity and aggravates the conflict leading to dead-ends, as seen in the Greek-Turkish conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the Cyprus and Kosovo problems.

A third element which appears in all the case studies examined in this collection, be they inter-state or ethnonational clashes, is self-identity and otherness, which is more often than not the real stumbling block, the crux of the problem that does not allow a just, logical and mutually beneficial settlement to evolve. In protracted historical conflicts the lack of resolution is due above all to the construction of the 'Self' and of the 'Other' and the respective national historical narratives, which belittle and demonize the other party. National identities *cum* historical narratives are the real reasons for the inability to settle a conflict or to settle it only provisionally, via a rickety *détente*, with no real reconciliation; and for the tendency to feel psychology more at ease (cognitive consistency) with their ongoing antagonism based on their mutual misperceptions, enemy images and total lack of mutual confidence and understanding. Characteristic such cases are the Greeks and the Turks, the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, the Israeli and the Palestinians or the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.

To refer to three glaring examples: the Israelis regard the Palestinians as Arabs and not as Palestinians and all of them actual or potential terrorists, while the Palestinians regard the Israelis as merely members of a religious community, the Hebrews, and not a nation and a as community alien to the Middle East. The Greek-Cypriots regard the Turkish-Cypriots as Turks and not as Cypriots, the descendants of the Ottoman Turkish 'occupiers' and as outsiders to the island, while the Turkish-Cypriots return the compliment by regarding the Greek-Cypriots not even as Greeks, but as *Rum*, members of the Orthodox Christian community (the *Rum millet*) which was historically subservient within the Ottoman Empire and their present state (the Republic of Cyprus) legally non-existent but simply the Greek-Cypriot administration. In the Greek-Macedonian conundrum until its final resolution in 2018, the Greeks regarded the ethnic Macedonians as an artificial nation created arbitrarily by Tito in the 1940s and basically as Bulgarians (incidentally this also happens to be the Bulgarian view until today) and the ethnic Macedonians for their part regarded the Greeks as unrelated to the ancient Macedonians and themselves heirs to that legacy (to be fair this was the view of one of the two tendencies in that country).

The collection starts (Part I) with an article that addresses a classic and persisting debate in international politics, which revolves around ethics: the view that ethics and the pursuit of a principled and ethnical course are irrelevant as well as damaging in foreign policy decision-making; and the very opposite view which regards ethics and norms indispensable, unavoidable and beneficial in international politics and foreign policy, in theory as well as in praxis. First the line of reasoning of classical realism (Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli) is presented followed in greater detail with modern-day realists, with emphasis on the main arguments for discarding ethics. Then the counter-arguments of liberalism and other approaches (e.g. human rights, normative inter-

national relations) are amply presented, my agenda being to show that they are more convincing than the arguments of the realists.

Part II examines the international legal and wider normative dimension of self-determination. The first article addresses the challenge of ethnicity and secessionist bids in the post-bipolar era, proposing a paradigm shift, a new international normative framework more conducive to peace and security than the existing one. The empirical finding regarding the period the Cold War and the early post-Cold War era is that repression and other high-handed state tactics are ineffective in dealing with sizeable politicized communal groups and that the opposite state strategy, accommodation, including power-sharing and devolution are more suited when dealing with societies deeply divided on ethnic or other communal grounds. The existing international normative regime inherited from the Cold War era (with its ban on secession and no opening for autonomy) is insufficient for managing and resolving separatist conflicts. Three alternatives are explored: partial recasting with emphasis on devolution; a secessionist option for some federations; and secessionist self-determination for tormented minorities on the basis of well-defined criteria. The paper concludes with its main contribution, which is a set of prerequisites for exceptional unilateral independence (secession), distinguished into necessary prerequisites and additional reinforcing factors (this approach is closer to what came to be known in the 1990s as 'remedial secession').

The second paper is a *tour d'horizon* of self-determination and secession from the late 18th century until today, the initial emphasis being on international law and the view of international lawyers from the 19th century until today. Four periods are scrutinised: (1) the emergence of the concept in the late 18th century and early 19th century (then known as principle of nationality or nationalities), the 'heroic phase' in the long 19th century (age of nationalism or nationalities, 1776-1914), even though, with few exceptions, it was not accepted as a legal principle by the majority of international lawyers and did not manage to become part of international law; (2) the brief heyday of the norm of 'national' self-determination with Wilson's contribution, the Paris Peace Conference and its controversial outcome as far as self-determination is concerned (with most nations and ethnic entities not liberated, especially those in Asia and Africa); (3) the anti-colonial Cold War period (1945-1990) with secession beyond the pale and self-determination limited to non-self-governing territories that is anti-colonialism; and (4) the partly remedial period, with 'remedial secession' (a remedy for huge injustices and extended violations of human rights) increasingly but far from wholly acceptable among scholars of International Relations (IR) and international law, with the UN framework largely remaining restrictive as regards secessions, accepting mainly mutually acceptable ones, that is partitions. Then there is a thorough presentation of the various theories of secession developed in normative international relations and political theory, placed under three approaches, which is the most widely accepted categorization (remedial approach, choice and nationality), with the presentation of the pros and cons of each approach. The paper concludes with various alternatives in the realm of international law and normative international relations (devolution, federations, remedial secession).

Part III examines aspects of separatism in more detail, in particular its manifestations, involvement in separatist conflicts and the ending of separatist wars. The first article addresses three manifestations of separatism: partition ('velvet divorce'), secession ('confrontational divorce') and autonomy. In an attempt to address state fears, devolution-autonomy is approached mainly (a) by attempting to set clear-cut criteria for its realisation in some instances; (b) by pointing out that the record for successful military rather than political solutions is increasingly bleak as far as states are concerned; and (c) that as regards the 'slippery slope' effect, a well-known nightmare of states, though real it is far from pervasive and that in most cases the responsibility for breakdown of a previous agreement lays more in the behaviour of central authorities as 'spoilers' and less on recalcitrant separatists.

The second article tries to establish patterns of interaction between the international system and secessionist minorities. It is based on the findings of seven Cold War secessionist movements, those of Katanga, Biafra, the Southern Sudan, Bangladesh, Iraqi Kurdistan, Eritrea and the Moro region of the Philippines. It presents and analyzes the constraints on involvement (why non-in-

volvement), the content of actual involvement (diplomatic, tangible and military support), and the reasons for external state involvement (distinguished into instrumental and affective reasons); and it tests seven assumptions of conventional wisdom to determine if they hold true in the cases studied. The research confirmed mainly one of the common assumptions about the involvement and role of external states in secessionist conflicts: that neighbouring states find it difficult to avoid becoming involved in nearby conflicts. This article was a more operational presentation and further elaboration found in the concluding chapter of my first book, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1991). The article and the book's conclusion are considered one of the first main discussions that introduced intervention in separatist wars as a sub-field in the IR literature,¹ which has given rise to a veritable cottage-industry of almost a hundred articles and books, many of them too technical and quantitative for my liking.

The third article deals with separatist armed conflict and when does it finally end. The main argument that I tried to prove by examining almost 80 cases from 1950 until the 1990s is that contrary to civil wars (where the goal is to capture the central authority of a state), where military victory by one of the two parties is more likely to lead to an ending, in separatist conflicts this is rarely the case, and increasingly more rare in recent years: negotiated settlements are more practicable in ending such conflicts. The papers also covers three themes: when do such wars end, where some twelve reasons are entertained; why are such conflicts so prolonged, with several simply frozen with no military clashes but with no resolution in sight either; and the 'slippery slope' is also briefly addressed, where I agree with Ted Robert Gurr, that it is more likely to occur due to the incumbent's renegeing and less due to a switch on the part of the former separatists, save, I argue, in instants of avowed separatist-merger movements (union with the motherland state).

Part IV examines intervention, with emphasis on humanitarian intervention. The first article examines the intervention/non-intervention nexus which has confounded scholars and diplomats ever since its inception in the 18th century. Seven positions on non-intervention/intervention in the long 19th century are presented and compared with seven similar present-day positions. Kant's stance on the question is examined, from his own restrictive non-intervention premise in his seminal essay, *Towards Perpetual Peace*, which permits for only one exception, to the view of Kantian scholars, several of which tend to regard Kant as more open towards exceptions to intervention, including humanitarian intervention. J.S. Mill is far more detailed on the matter though equivocal. Five arguments on the part of Mill are identified in favour of non-intervention, especially if the internal war is against 'native tyrants' (where it is better to save themselves without 'foreign bayonets'); and five arguments lead to exceptions that allow for intervention, including struggles against foreign rule, counter-intervention and intervention for humanitarian reasons. The article concludes by highlighting the lasting contributions of Kant and Mill on intervention and non-intervention that are of relevance in today's world society.

The second article examines in considerable detail the history of humanitarian intervention within the international law literature and dogma, presenting the views of publicists in favour of or against humanitarian intervention from 1830 until the interwar years. The view of almost 100 international lawyers were taken into account and it was found that two out of three were in favour on legal or political or ethnical grounds, and one out of three against. My final conclusion is that it appears that humanitarian intervention in the wider sense of the concept (that is not limited only to armed intervention) was arguably part of customary international law from the 1860s or 1870s onwards, or at the very least it was an emerging customary norm prior to the advent of the UN system.

The third article tries to present a history of the controversial concept of humanitarian intervention from its original roots until today. The two main aims of the paper are firstly to address

¹ See for reference to my work as the initial impetus for this sub-field of research: David Carment, 'The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50:2 (1993), 137, 138, 139, 143, 145, 146 & 147 fn.5 & 12. David Carment, 'The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics', *Third World Quarterly*, 15:4 (1994), 554, 555, 562, 578 fn.15, 579 fn.24, p.580 fns 54,59 & 60. David Carment et al. *Who Intervenes? Ethnic Conflict and Interstate Crisis* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2006), 13-14, 110, 218 fn.11.

the question of the progenitor or progenitors of the idea in the Renaissance (Vitoria, Gentile, Bodin, Grotius, the 'monarchomachs'), which remains a matter of some controversy; and secondly to highlight the heyday of the concept in the 19th century, where the concept was formally developed and debated within international law. The arguments for or against humanitarian intervention in the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th century show many striking similarities with today's debate. The last part of the article deals with the post-Cold War era and refers to the main issues at stake in the present heated discussion on humanitarian intervention.

Part V addresses ethnonational conflict and conflict resolution with three case studies, two of which are still present today. The first article which refers to Southern Sudan covers the period until the mid-1980s, with emphasis on the first secessionist war of the 1960s: its etiology, international activity and international involvement, concluding with the 1972 Addis Ababa peace settlement which lasted for a dozen years. The beginning of the second secessionist war, which started in 1983 is also briefly presented. The article in question is an updated version of one of the case studies (probably the most original) in *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*, which considerably larger was one of the cases studies in my doctoral dissertation titled 'The International Dimension of Secessionist Movements' (University of Kent, 1985).

The second article deals with the complicated, violent-prone and intractable Middle East conflict as it appeared in the late 1980s, with the first Palestinian uprising (the first *intifadah*). Although very much has happened since then and things have turned to the worst far more than one could have imagined in the 1980s (see the recent terrible Hamas-Israel clash), the article addresses issues that remain relevant today (and the article has been cited even years later by scholars, including Arabs and Israelis). The main thrust of this article is to address the conflict from the prism of 'ethnic' conflict resolution. The resolution of conflicts between states and ethnonationalist movements (placed under fourteen different headings) is distinguished into 'denial' solutions and 'acceptance' solutions. My working hypothesis is that only acceptance solutions may lead to a process of conflict resolution through negotiations between the two main parties concerned, in this case the State of Israel and the PLO. Ten problems are identified as instrumental for the Israeli-Palestinian impasse and suggestions are made as to how they can be overcome. They include the objective (zero-sum) conflict of interest, conflict attitudes, the domestic factor, the positive functions of the conflict, ethnonationalism, the asymmetry between state and revolutionary movement, the religious-cultural dimension and the international dimension. The article in more extended form was the concluding chapter of my first book in Greek titled *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Problematique of Peaceful Resolution* (Athens: Papazissis, 1991).

The third article covers the Kosovo-Serbian conflict as it appeared a few years prior to the 1999 NATO Kosovo-Serbia intervention and was based, among others on research in Kosovo and discussions with key leaders, including Ibrahim Rugova. The ultimate aim of the paper was how to resolve the conflict without further suffering or bloodshed. Nine factors are put forward that make the conflict in question *prima facie* more amenable to a peaceful settlement by comparison to other cases (based on the state of play prior to the armed clash of the late 1990s that led to the NATO intervention). The peaceful solutions are placed under three headings: power-sharing coupled with meaningful devolution; more radical solutions such as secession; and an open-ended approach based on an interactional peace process that may include Track 2 Diplomacy. A first abridged version of the paper was previously published in a German periodical² and in a much more extended version, as 'Ethnonational and Separatist Conflict Settlement and the Case of Kosovo'; it was a chapter in Thanos Veremis and Evangelos Kofos (eds), *Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1998).

The fourth article deals with the Cyprus problem, mainly with the reasons for its non-resolution and for its legendary intractability. The paper is based on two books of mine in Greek published in 2002 and 2006 respectively³ and on several visits to Cyprus. It starts by highlighting three

² It was a requested article, titled 'Konfliktlösung am Beispiel der Kosovo-Frage', *Internationale Politik* (December 1995).

³ *The Cyprus Question: Conflict and Resolution* (Athens: I. Sideris, 2002); and *The Cyprus Problem, 1947-2004: Union or*

distinct features of the Cyprus debacle followed by a historical account, with emphasis on attempts at a settlement. The third and fourth parts examine the window of opportunity of 1999-2004 (Cyprus's European Union accession process and the Annan Plan) and the reasons for its spectacular failure, and the more recent negotiations (2008-2010) that was initially promising but failed. The last part focuses on nine reasons for the impasse that has made the Cyprus conflict impervious to reunification and conflict resolution, which, I argue, are the following (and may I add are also very much present today): (1) nationalism and national identity, (2) sheer irreconcilability of political goals, (3) the social-psychological dimension (mutual demonization), (4) mutual non-acceptance and denial of the other party's identity, (5) the negative role of the domestic factor, (6) the controversial normative dimension, (7) disagreement as to what constitutes a just solution, (8) the difficulties with federalism, and (9) the fear of change brought about by a settlement and its possible disadvantages to one's community.

Part IV deal with bilateral international conflicts and conflict resolution. The first article addresses the long-standing Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey. The paper presents the little-known two instances of meaningful Greek-Turkish talks on the Aegean (in 1975-1981 and 2002-2003) highlighting points of convergence that had closed the gap between the two parties. Indeed the parameters of a settlement are more than obvious, yet the conflict remains in place since the mid-1970s, not permitting an overall Greek-Turkish reconciliation. I argue that the main reason for the impasse is that behind the tangible interests at stake lie mutual fears and mistrust as to the intentions of the other party regarding the Aegean ('Greek lake' on the Turkish side, 'splitting the Aegean in two' on the Greek case). This is but the tip of the iceberg of what is a deeply engrained antagonism founded on historical memories, real or imagined, that depict the 'Other' as the implacable adversary. The article in question is based on two books of mine, one in Greek (in 2007)⁴ and the second in English, entitled *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

The second article deals with the wider protracted Greek-Turkish antagonism. The paper begins by presenting ten reasons for the enduring Greek-Turkish rivalry and indicates that all of them can be overcome (and at times have been overcome). Yet they retain their salience, with no resolution of the outstanding Greek-Turkish differences in sight, in spite of bilateral talks (especially as regards the Aegean conflict) and the Greek-Turkish détente of the years 1999-2016. The thrust of the paper is that the non-resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict is less due to the incompatibility of tangible interests and above all the result of their chosen national identities cum historical narratives: their collective identities which are built on slighting and demonizing the 'Other' and concomitant national historical narratives, both of which are presented in considerable detail. The article concludes with 'what is to be done' on the basis of critical thinking and attitude change. The paper in question is based on my first and last chapters in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*.

The third article addresses one of the few instances of conflict resolution in Southeastern Europe: the Greek-Macedonian conflict known as 'the Macedonia naming dispute' which commenced in 1991, mainly as 'symbolic conflict' (according to the literature of anthropology). The main focus of the paper is on the negotiation process, the 'sticking points', the mutual compromises and sacrifices that had to be made. The final agreement was more favourable to Greece which made the utmost of the fact that Macedonia (now North Macedonia) was keen to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO and the EU), for security and other vital reasons. The article concludes by expressing the hope that what is an asymmetric agreement would, in the years to come, become more balanced and positive-sum through an implementation that would benefit both parties. This paper is based mainly on the concluding chapter of two of my more recent books, one in Greek, published in 2018⁵ and the second in English, titled *The Macedonian Question and the Macedonians: A History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021).

Partition? (Athens: I. Sideris, 2006).

⁴ *Irreconcilable Neighbours: Greece-Turkey. The Aegean Dispute* (Athens: I. Sideris, 2007).

⁵ *The Macedonian Question, 1878-2018: from National Claims to Conflictual National Identities* (Athens: Themelio, 2018)

By way of conclusion, I would like to warmly thank a number of individuals who through the years have offered me advice, encouragement and inspiration. They include in my formative years as an aspiring scholar, John W. Burton (1915-2010), A.J.R. Groom, Dennis Sandole (1941-2018), and C.R. Mitchell; and from the 1990s until today Hercules Millas, Christos Rozakis, Theodore Couloumbis (1935-2022), Thanos Veremis, Evangelos Kofos (1934-2022), Tozun Bahcheli, Hakan Yilmaz, Denko Maleski, Mirjana Maleska, Ada Dialla, Asteris Huliaras, Petros Liakouras, Christos Lyrintzis, Panayiotis Tsakonas, Christos Frangonikolopoulos and Dimitris Livanios. Thanks are also due to my Cypriot colleagues and friends: Joseph Payiatis (1937-2016), Takis Hadjidemetriou, Chrysostomos Pericleous, Yiannis Papadakis, Christos Zanos, Philippos Savvides, Christos Stylianides, Makarios Drousiotis, Maria Hadjipavlou and Niyazi Kizilyurek. A special word of thanks is due to Professor James Mayal who graciously agreed to write an eloquent preface to this collection. I would also like to thank publisher Petros Papasarrantopoulos (Epikentro) for giving these articles a new lease of life.